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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040174-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for two counts of automobile homicide, second 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2002); one count of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002); two counts of child abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp. 2000); and one count of possessing an open container of 
alcohol in a vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20 
(supp. 2002). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was defense counsel ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a 
warrantless blood draw, where defendant was unconscious when his blood was drawn, 
and under Utah's implied consent statute an unconscious person is considered to have 
consented? 
2. Was defense counsel ineffective for not asking the trial court to merge 
defendant's DUI conviction with his automobile homicide conviction, where automobile 
homicide is an enhancement statute that the legislature did not intend to merge with a 
DUI conviction? 
Standard of Review. These issues are raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, no 
standard of review applies. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are attached as Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2002) 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 2002) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (West 2004) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (Supp. 2002) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two counts of automobile homicide, one count of 
driving under the influence of alcohol, two counts of child abuse, one count of possession of 
a controlled substance, and one count of possession of an open container of alcohol in a 
vehicle (R. 1-2,25-26). After a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on 
all counts except the charge of possession of a controlled substance, which it dismissed (R. 
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29-30, 37-38; 226:45). A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 170-73, 191-94; 
229:360-61). The court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of one to fifteen 
years for the two automobile homicide counts, one concurrent prison term of zero to five 
years for driving under the influence of alcohol, and two consecutive one-year jail terms for 
the child abuse counts (R. 204-08, 210-14). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 
209). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 26, 2002, defendant rolled his pickup truck on 1-15 near Leeds, Utah (R. 
228:58,61). The pickup's occupants—defendant, defendant's pregnant wife, and their two 
children—were ejected from the vehicle (R. 228:58). Defendant's wife and unborn child 
were killed, and his children were seriously injured (R. 228:60, 131, 151). A sample of 
defendant's blood taken shortly after the accident contained .24 grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood—three times the legal limit (R. 228:116). 
Witnesses saw defendant drinking and driving erratically before the accident. A 
cashier at a truck stop in Parowan, approximately an hour north of the crash site, testified 
that defendant had stopped and tried to buy $20 in gasoline (R. 228:85). She smelled a very 
strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant (R. 228:86). Defendant was angry and 
argumentative because he was having trouble pumping his gas (R. 228:85-86). He 
ultimately drove off without buying any gas (R. 228:86). The cashier wrote down 
defendant's license plate and called police (R. 228:87-89; State's Ex. No. 10, track 4). 
A truck driver, Shaine Dunkle, saw defendant pulling into a rest area just south of 
Cedar City (R. 228:57). Defendant stopped suddenly and threw his pickup into reverse, 
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nearly hitting the car the behind him (R. 228:57). Defendant got back on the freeway and 
followed Dunkle for a few minutes before passing him "like [Dunkle] was sitting on blocks" 
(R. 228:57). A couple of miles further down the road, Dunkle passed defendant's pickup 
sitting by the side of the road (R. 228:57). Defendant began following Dunkle again (R. 
228:57). He then passed Dunkle and two other eighteen-wheelers by driving on the rumble 
strip in the far left shoulder (R. 228:57). Dunkle noticed that defendant was drinking from 
an open aluminum can between his legs and was having trouble keeping his pickup truck 
"between the lines" (R. 228:58, 61). 
After a couple of more miles, Dunkle saw defendant drift onto the dirt on the right 
shoulder (R. 228:58). When defendant tried to get back on the highway, he apparently over-
steered, and the pickup truck rolled (R. 228:58). Dunkle saw defendant's two children fly 
out of the truck (R. 228:58). He also saw a "whole lot of cans and stuff going flying 
everywhere" (R. 228:58). Dunkle used his truck to block off the road and protect the two 
children, who lay bleeding in the middle of the freeway (R. 228:59). He then called 9-1-1 
and reported the accident (R. 228:60). 
Washington County Sheriffs deputies and Utah Highway Patrol troopers arrived 
within minutes (R. 228:98, 151, 176). Medical personnel also arrived and transported 
defendant and his children to the Dixie Regional Medical Center (R. 228:151, 159, 185). 
Defendant's wife was dead at the scene (R. 228:151). Police observed approximately a 
twelve-pack of beer cans strewn about (R. 228:153; State's Ex. Nos. 6-9). Some were 
opened and at least one was cold and half-full (226:18, 20). The supervising officer asked 
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Trooper Shawn Hinton to go to Dixie Regional and supervise a blood draw from defendant 
(R. 228:185-86). 
At Dixie Regional, Trooper Hinton obtained defendant's identification (R. 228:190). 
Defendant and his children were the only trauma victims in the hospital (R. 228:192). 
Trooper Hinton gave a blood draw kit to Joanne Nielson, an emergency room nurse, and 
asked her to take a sample of defendant's blood (R. 228:186). Trooper Kevin Davis later 
testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant was unconscious when Joanne drew his 
blood (R. 226:32). Trooper Hinton testified at trial that defendant was unconscious when 
Joanne drew his blood (R. 228:191). Joanne testified at trial that defendant was awake and 
conscious when she drew his blood and that she could not remember whether Trooper 
Hinton had asked defendant for consent to draw his blood (229:243-44). She later corrected 
herself, however, and testified that she could not remember if defendant was conscious when 
she drew his blood (R. 229:245). She just remembered defendant "moaning and a few things 
like that" (R. 229:245). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to suppress the 
evidence of the blood-alcohol test and for not moving to merge the driving under the 
influence ("DUI") conviction into the automobile homicide convictions. To prove 
ineffectiveness, defendant must demonstrate both that his counsel rendered deficient 
performance and that his counsel's performance prejudiced him. Defendant bears the burden 
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of ensuring that the record on appeal is adequate to demonstrate ineffectiveness. Record 
deficiencies are construed in favor of finding that counsel was effective. 
The record is insufficient to review defendant's claim that his counsel should have 
filed a motion to suppress. Defendant asserts that the State could not have proved exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless blood draw. The record, however, is devoid of any 
evidence of whether the State could have proved exigency. Defendant never asked for a rule 
23B remand to supplement the record with evidence demonstrating a lack of exigency. This 
Court must therefore assume that there exists evidence to support exigency and that defense 
counsel was therefore effective. 
In any event, counsel's decision not to file a motion to suppress the blood-alcohol test 
did not constitute ineffective assistance because counsel had no reason to believe that such a 
motion would succeed. It is well established that under Utah's implied consent law an 
unconscious person is considered not to have withdrawn his consent to a chemical test. 
Officers at both the preliminary hearing and the trial testified that defendant was unconscious 
when the nurse drew his blood. Therefore, defendant's blood draw was consensual, and a 
motion to suppress would have been futile. 
Counsel was also not ineffective for not asking the court to merge defendant's 
convictions for DUI and automobile homicide. Automobile homicide is an enhancement 
statute, and the legislature therefore intended that intoxicated drivers who cause the death of 
another by criminal negligence be punished for both impaired driving and automobile 
homicide. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE THE MOTIONS DEFENDANT CLAIMS 
HIS COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE MADE WOULD HAVE BEEN 
FUTILE 
Defendant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 
counsel did not move to suppress evidence of his blood-alcohol level and did not move to 
merge his conviction for driving under the influence ("DUI") with his convictions for 
automobile homicide. See Br. Aplt. at 13. 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy 
judged with the benefit of hindsight." Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per 
curiam). To establish that he did not receive the representation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, defendant must prove two elements. First, he must identify the specific acts or 
omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687-88,690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,521 (Utah 
1994). Second "defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, % 26, 1 P.3d 546. 
Defendant also has the burden of assuring an adequate record on appeal. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ f 16,12 P.3d 92. Defendant may not rely on speculation to support 
allegations of ineffective assistance, but must prove that the ineffective assistance is a 
"demonstrable reality." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 526 (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
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870, 877 (Utah 1993)). "[Wjhere the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities 
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,117. 
A. The record on appeal is insufficient to review defendant's claim 
that his counsel should have filed a motion to suppress. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court would have granted a motion to suppress 
evidence obtained from the warrantless blood draw because u[t]he State could not have met 
its burden of showing exigent circumstances." See Br. Aplt. at 19. 
As a threshold matter, the record is insufficient to demonstrate that the State could not 
have proven exigent circumstances. This Court has held that the dissipation of alcohol, 
without more, is not an exigency that excuses officers from seeking a warrant. See State v. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, f 14, 93 P.3d 854, cert granted by 100 P.3d 220 (Utah). 
Instead, this Court requires the State to demonstrate exigency by satisfying a list of factors 
from City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1392 (Utah App. 1994). Those factors include 
the distance to the nearest magistrate, the availability of a telephonic warrant, the feasibility 
of a stake-out or other form of surveillance, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related 
offense, the commission of another offense such as fleeing the scene of an accident, the 
ongoing and continuing nature of the investigation, the extent of probable cause, and the 
conduct of the investigating officers. See Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, ^  16. 
Defendant's assertion that there is no evidence from which the State could prove 
exigency is wholly speculative and improperly shifts the burden to provide an adequate 
record on appeal to the State. The record deficiencies are not the result of the State being 
8 
unable to produce evidence of exigency. Rather, they are the result of defense counsel's 
decision not to seek suppression of the blood draw. Defendant never asked the State to 
prove exigency. He now claims that there is no evidence supporting exigency, yet nothing in 
the record demonstrates that the State could not have provided such evidence had defendant 
filed a motion to suppress. Moreover, when he decided on appeal to accuse his trial counsel 
of ineffectiveness, he never tried to supplement the record through a rule 23B remand. 
Accordingly, this Court must assume that had defendant asked the State to show exigency, at 
trial or on a rule 23B remand, the State would have provided sufficient evidence of exigency 
to excuse officers from seeking a warrant. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17 ("Where the 
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively."). 
In any event, the State would not have had to establish exigent circumstances, 
because, as trial counsel undoubtedly realized, defendant was unconscious when police drew 
his blood, and an unconscious person is deemed not to have revoked the consent created by 
Utah's implied consent statute. 
B. The trial court would not have granted a motion to suppress 
because defendant was deemed to have consented to the blood 
draw by Utah's implied consent statute. 
A blood draw is a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). As such, police may only draw a suspect's blood if they have 
probable cause and a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. See Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-70. One well-recognized exception to 
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the warrant requirement is for searches pursuant to consent. See Washington v. Chrisman, 
455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982); State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, If 43, 37 P.3d 1073. 
The Utah Legislature has decided that those who enjoy the privilege of driving on 
Utah's roads must also consent to a chemical test if they are found driving under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol. "A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered 
to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine," if the 
investigating officer has probable cause to believe the person is guilty of DUI. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44.10(l)(a) (Supp. 2002). If a person refuses to submit to a chemical test, the 
Driver's License Division may immediately revoke their license. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44.10(2). However, "[a]ny person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not 
have withdrawn the consent." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-44.10(3). Accordingly, "the test or 
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not." Id. 
This Court upheld a warrantless blood draw on an unconscious suspect under the 
implied consent statute in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12,15-16 (Utah App. 1988). Wight was 
the driver in a two-car accident in which the other driver was killed. Id. at 14. He was taken 
to the hospital where a highway patrolman observed that Wight was unconscious and had 
alcohol on his breath. Id. The highway patrolman ordered a blood draw, which revealed that 
Wight's blood-alcohol level was .20 percent, more than twice the legal limit. Id. A jury 
subsequently convicted Wight of automobile homicide. Id. 
On appeal, Wight asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to 
suppress the blood sample. Id. at 15-16. This Court disagreed and held that objecting to the 
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evidence would have been futile because Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 "allows drawing 
blood from an unconscious person." Id. at 16; see also In re K.K.H., 610 P.2d 849, 853 
(Utah 1980) (holding that implied consent statute makes actual consent unnecessary if 
suspect is incapable of consenting or refusing). 
Other states with similar implied consent statutes have also allowed blood draws 
based on an unconscious suspect's implied consent. See e.g. Smith v. State, 460 So.2d 343, 
346 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); Bush v. Bright, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123,124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968); 
Morrow v. State, 303 A.2d 633, 635 (Del. 1973); State v. Tronolone, 532 So.2d 1127,1128 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Holmes v. State, 350 S.E.2d 497,498 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); People 
v. Polk, 451 N.E.2d 579, 579-80 (111. App. Ct. 1983); State v. Campbell, 615 P.2d 190, 197 
(Mont. 1980); State v. Wyrostek, 767 P.2d 379, 380-81 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); People v. 
Dombrowski-Bove, 753 N.Y.S.2d 259,260-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see also Patricia Jean 
Lamkin, Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Case of Blood Alcohol Test where Blood was 
Taken from Unconscious Driver, 72 A.L.R.3d 325 § 9 (1976) (listing cases in which courts 
have upheld admissibility of blood draw taken from unconscious suspect pursuant to implied 
consent law). 
In the instant case, defendant does not dispute that Trooper Hinton had probable cause 
to believe that he was guilty of driving under the influence and that a sample of his blood 
would provide evidence of his crime. Defendant claims only that "the State could not have 
met its burden of establishing exigent circumstances sufficient to overcome the need for a 
warrant." Br. Aplt. at 19. The State would not have needed to establish exigent 
circumstances, however, because defendant consented to a blood draw by driving his pickup 
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in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44.10( 1 )(a). That consent remained in force at the time 
Joanne Nielson drew defendant's blood because defendant was unconscious and unable to 
refuse the test. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(3) ("Any person who is dead, 
unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any 
chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
Subsection (1 ) . . . . " ) . 
In light of the testimony from officers at both the preliminary hearing and at trial that 
defendant was unconscious when his blood was drawn, trial counsel was not ineffective for 
deciding not to file a motion to withdraw. The only testimony that defendant was awake 
when his blood was drawn came from Joanne Nielson on the second day of trial (R. 
229:243). But, Joanne almost immediately retracted her testimony and stated that she could 
not remember whether defendant was conscious when she drew his blood (R. 229:245). 
There being no evidence that defendant was capable of refusing consent to draw his blood, 
trial counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to file a motion to suppress.1 
In any event, exigent circumstances did exist because Rodriguez was wrongly 
decided—the dissipation of blood-alcohol evidence, without more, is an exigency. This is 
holding of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 
To the extent that Joanne's testimony creates a factual question as to whether 
defendant was unconscious when she drew his blood, the burden is defendant's to resolve the 
factual question before asserting his claim. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, % 17 ("[W]here the 
record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom 
simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed effectively."). 
Defendant has not asked for a rule 23B remand. This Court should therefore construe the 
record as establishing that defendant was unconscious when his blood was drawn. See id. 
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(1966). It is also the holding of the majority of jurisdictions to consider the issue. See 
Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196,1204-05 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reid, 929 
F.2d 990, 993 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1989); 
State v. Cocio, 709 P.2d 1336,1345 (Ariz. 1985); People v. Clark, 857 P.2d 1099,1125 (Cal. 
1993) (in bank); People v. Sugarman, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 689,692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); State 
v. Taylor, 531 A.2d 157,160-161 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); State v. McGarry,All So.2d 1030, 
1031-32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Entrekin, 47 P.3d 336,348 (Haw. 2002); State v. 
Cooper, 39 P.3d 637, 640-41 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); State v. Murry, 21 P.3d 528, 534-35 
(Kan. 2001); State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489,493 (Me. 1985); People v. Morris, 242 N.W.2d 
47, 49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 245 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. 1976); 
State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68,74 (Minn. 1978); State v. Lerette, 858 S.W.2d 816, 818-
19 (Mo. App. Ct. 1993); Galvan v. State, 655 P.2d 155, 157 (Nev. 1982); State v. Ravotto, 
111 A.2d 301, 315 (N.J. 2001); Wilhelmiv. Dir. ofDep'tofTransp., 498N.W.2d 150, 155 
(N.D. 1993); State v. Milligan, 748 P.2d 130, 134 (Or. 1988) (en banc); State v. Engesser, 
661 N.W.2d 739,748 (S.D. 2m);Aliffv. State, 627 S.W.2d 166,169-170 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1982); Tipton v. Commonwealth, AAA S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Baldwin, 31 
P.3d 1220, 1224-25 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Bohling, 494 N.W.2d 399, 402-07 
(Wis. 1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 836 (1993). Thus, even under an exigent circumstances 
analysis, defendant's blood draw did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Utah Supreme 
Court has granted the State's certiorari petition in Rodriguez to review this issue. See State 
v. Rodriguez, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004). 
Thus, defendant's claim fails. 
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C. The legislature did not intend that a conviction for driving under 
the influence of alcohol should merge into a conviction for 
automobile homicide. 
Defendant next asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the court to 
merge his DUI conviction with his automobile homicide convictions. See Br. Aplt. at 20. 
He claims that counsel's failure subjected him to double jeopardy in violation of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. See Br. Aplt. at 20-21.2 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides three protections. See 
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493,497-98 (1984). It protects against a second prosecution for 
the same offense after an acquittal; it protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after a conviction; and it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 
Id. at 498. Defendant's claim implicates the third protection—multiple punishments for the 
same offense. 
The protection against multiple punishments "is designed to ensure that the sentencing 
discretion of courts is confined to the limits established by the legislature." Id. at 499. 
"[T]he substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the 
legislature/' so that "the question under the Double Jeopardy clause whether punishments are 
'multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent." Id. (citations omitted); State v. McCovey, 
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) ("Resolution of the issue requires a determination of 
2
 Defendant has not briefed a separate Utah Constitution claim. Thus, this Court 
should review his claim only under the jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13,1f 14,2005 WL 387966 (noting 
that court is "resolute in [its] refusal to take up constitutional issues which have not been 
properly preserved, framed and briefed"). 
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whether the legislature intended aggravated robbery to be a lesser included offense of second 
degree felony murder."). 
The question of whether a defendant has been punished multiple times for the same 
offense is usually resolved by determining whether one of the offenses is a lesser-included 
offense of the other. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004); State v. Hill, 61A P.2d 
96, 97 (Utah 1983). "A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). "An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by 
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged . . . ." Id. "Thus, where the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot be 
committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,'... then as a matter of law they 
stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot be convicted 
or punished for both." Hill, 61A P.2d at 97 (quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152,156 (Utah 
1983)). 
Courts do not, however, always rely blindly on theoretical comparisons of statutory 
elements to divine the ultimate question of legislative intent. In State v. McCovey, the Utah 
Supreme Court held, "Despite the fact that under the Hill analysis aggravated robbery would 
be a lesser included offense of felony murder, we recognize that enhancement statutes are 
different in nature than other criminal statutes." 803 P.2d at 1237. McCovey was convicted 
of aggravated robbery and felony-murder for his participation in a video store robbery in 
which a customer was fatally shot. Id. at 1234. He asserted that aggravated robbery was a 
lesser included offense of felony-murder under Hill because felony murder required the State 
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to prove all the elements of aggravated robbery plus that defendant caused the death of 
another during the commission of the robbery. Id. at 1235. In other words, the State could 
only prove felony murder by first proving that defendant committed aggravated robbery. 
After noting that aggravated robbery was a lesser-included offense of felony murder 
under the Hill test, and that enhancement statutes were different from other lesser-included 
offenses, the McCovey court examined the traditional purpose of felony murder. See id. at 
1237. It determined that "the Utah State Legislature did not intend the multiple crimes of 
felony murder to be punished as a single crime, but rather, that the homicide be enhanced to 
second degree felony murder in addition to the underlying felony." Id. at 1239. Thus, even 
though aggravated robbery was a lesser-included offense of felony murder under the Hill 
test, the Utah Supreme Court looked beyond Hill to the legislature's actual intent and held 
that McCovey could be convicted of aggravated robbery and felony murder even where 
aggravated robbery was the predicate offense for felony murder. See McCovey, 803 P.2d at 
1239. 
This Court followed McCovey in State v. Smith to hold that aggravated assault did not 
merge with second-degree use of a concealed weapon because the concealed weapon statute 
"is most properly characterized as an enhancement statute to which the legislature did not 
intend merger to apply." State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, U 22, 65 P.3d 648, cert, granted, 
76 P.3d 691. The Court noted that "[t]he penalties imposed by [the concealed weapon 
statute] increase proportionally to the increased risk to the public, and this graduated 
punishment scale is indicative of an enhancement statute." Id. 
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At first glance, DUI appears to be a lesser-included offense of automobile homicide 
under the Hill analysis. Both statutes require the State to show that the defendant operated a 
vehicle with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or greater or under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207. Automobile homicide then has the 
additional elements of causing the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a 
negligent or criminally negligent manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207. Thus, under 
Hill, a DUI conviction is a lesser included offense of automobile homicide. 
A closer examination, however, reveals that, like felony murder in McCovey and 
felony concealed weapon possession in Smith, automobile homicide is an enhancement 
offense. It raises a Class A negligent homicide to a second degree felony when the crime 
involves a vehicle and the actor is under the influence of alcohol. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-206 (West 2004). Like felony murder, see Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203(d) (West 
2004), the automobile homicide statute "automatically enhances the degree of the offense 
and punishment without the necessity of considering [an additional] mens rea or mental 
state." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. "Were it not for the [automobile homicide] statute, an 
accidental, negligent, or reckless homicide . . . would only be punishable as . . . negligent 
homicide, a class A misdemeanor." McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1238. 
Moreover, DUI and automobile homicide serve different purposes and punish distinct 
acts. DUI is a traffic offense found in Chapter 6 of Title 41, Traffic Rules and Regulations. 
Its purpose is to increase road safety by prohibiting intoxicated persons from driving on 
Utah's roads. It punishes the act of driving while impaired, without any showing of mens 
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rea. Automobile homicide, conversely, is an offense against the person found in the 
homicide section of Title 76, the Criminal Code. It punishes causing the death of another by 
negligent operation of an automobile while driving under the influence. Thus, unlike DUI, 
automobile homicide requires a mens rea of criminal negligence. 
In other words, the two crimes share a common element—operating a vehicle under 
the influence of alcohol—but otherwise punish different acts for different purposes. It is 
likely, therefore, that the legislature intended that a person, like defendant, who kills another 
while driving under the influence be punished both for automobile homicide and for driving 
under the influence. The crimes do not merge, and defense counsel was not, therefore, 
ineffective for failing to request merger. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
A* 
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Addendum 
41-6-44, Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
a combination of both or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of 
blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment 
— Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Sus-
pension or revocation of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless 
driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled 
substance that is taken illegally in the body; 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or 
a combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which 
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, 
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against anyx 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (sL) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a ja i l sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for no t less thai) 
240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d); and 
(hi) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines tha t substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 tha t is com-
mitted after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after 
July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of 
this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the 
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which 
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection 
(13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandato-
rily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction Tor a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment/an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treat-
ment costs. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend 
the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-
221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).^  
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior 
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is commit-
ted within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; 
and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards, 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person 
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation" provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then 
the court shall enter ttie reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol 
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning, 
report — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap-
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have 
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine 
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-
232, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measur-
able controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are 
administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohib-
ited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-232, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug 
under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled sub-
stance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any 
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select 
the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any 
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a 
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or 
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit 
to the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested 
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under 
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the 
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests that 
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the 
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (2)(a), if the person does 
not immediately request that the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to 
operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on 
behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and 
(hi) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the Driver 
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing 
before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may if approved as to form by the 
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) As a matter of procedure, the peace officer shall submit a signed 
report, within ten calendar days after the date of the arrest, that he had 
grounds to believe the arrested person had been operating or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44, 53-3-231, or 53-3-
232, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measur-
able controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the 
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the Driver License Division's 
intention to revoke his license under this section is entitled to a 
hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be made in writing within ten 
calendar days after the date of the arrest. 
(Hi) Upon written request, the division shall grant to the person an 
opportunity to be heard within 29 days after the date of arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a 
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest 
for a period of: 
(A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(e)(iv)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 
53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, "under 
Section 41-6-44. 
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person, the hearing shall be 
conducted by the Driver License Division in the county in which the 
offense occurred, unless the division and the person both agree that the 
hearing may be held in some other county. 
(g) The hearing shall be documented and shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a 
person was operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44, 
41-6-44.6, or 53-3-231; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit to the test, 
(h) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized 
agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the 
attendance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and. 
papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace 
officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees and mileage from the 
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 78-46-28. 
(i) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division determines that the 
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to 
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver 
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division 
shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah 
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period o£ 
(i) (A) 18 months unless Subsection (2)(i)(i)(B) applies; or 
(B) 24 months if the person has had a previous license sanction 
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223, 
53-3-231, 53-3-232, or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under 
Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the 
person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(13), 
a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's 
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed 
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this Subsection 
(2) that the revocation was improper. 
{j) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License 
Division under this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial. 
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the offense 
occurred. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to 
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or 
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may 
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation 
does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws 
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to 
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility 
at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal 
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer*
 t 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of 
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of 
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or 
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body. 
§ 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 2 . Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode— 
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or convic-
tion and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other 
such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single crimi-
nal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required 
to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepara-
tion to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; 
or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment 
of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, 
if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
§ 76 -5 -206 . Negligent homicide 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with 
criminal negligence, causes the death of another. 
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor. 
76-5-207. Automobile homicide. 
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third 
degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a 
negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subse-
quent chemical test shows that the person has a blood 
orv breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation, 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" 
means simple negligence, the failure to ^exercise that 
degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exer-
cise under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a)g Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second 
degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a 
criminally negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subse-
quent chemical test shows that the person has a blood 
or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of 
.08 grams or greater at the time of operation, 
(b) For the purpose of this section, "criminally negli-
gent" means criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 
76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided 
by Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
section. 
(4) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration 
under this section shall be made in accordance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-44(2). 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug 
is not a defense to any charge of violating this section. 
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol con-
tent or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by 
Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any 
self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, 
motorcycle, train, engine, watercraffc, or aircraft. 2002 
